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Summary: In my study, I took into account the design faults of the state-funded, pay-as-you-go system and realised that its 
principle (created in arrears) is defective, and it is necessary to move to a new operating principle to correct it. We have to forget 
about the existing so-called ‘unfunded’ pension system, and the state pension system shall be explicitly placed on its real basis, 
human capital. This results in an automatic asset/liability matching that is currently totally missing, and we can forget about 
the usual debates about the sustainability of the pension system. The result of such a system would probably be an increase 
in the number of births compared to today, but this is not the purpose of the proposed reform, which I intend to elaborate in a 
separate study, i.e. how this can be put into practice.1
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Over the past few decades, a rigorous protocol 
has been developed for studies and lectures on 
state-funded, pay-as-you-go (pAYG) pension 
systems around the world, including in 
Hungary2.
STaTe PenSIon SySTemS  
and demograPHIcS – ‘SurFace 
TreaTmenTS’
The author/lecturer describes the demographic 
trends in the developed world and the country 
covered by the article, the low and typically 
declining total fertility rate (tFR) and ever 
increasing life expectancy. He mentions that 
these reduce the number of children and 
juveniles and increase the proportion of older 
people in the population, and the dependency 
ratio is steadily increasing, and concluded 
that measures have to be taken to stop this 
tendency. i also agree with the latter; however, 
i would disregard these ‘compulsory’ circles 
because related information can easily be 
obtained by the reader [e.g. Oksanen (2003); 
Orbán, palotai (2006); Bajkó et. al. (2015); 
Berki, palotai, Reiff (2016); Varga (2014)]. 
As a way out of the situation, experts tend to E-mail address:  jozsef.banyar@uni-corvinus.hu
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recommend a variety of solutions, which are 
usually divided into two groups: parametric 
and paradigmatic reforms.
parametric reforms, which i will propose 
elsewhere, aim to improve the balance in a 
deteriorating situation. Their most important 
forms are, for example, raising the age limit and 
tightening the indexation of pensions, which was 
applied, for example, by the Bajnai government 
in 2009, or the abolition of unjustified benefits 
in 2011 applied by the Orbán government. 
These are important tools, but the improved 
balance between the revenue and expenditure 
side of the public pension fund is temporary. 
in addition, tightened indexation, for example, 
opens up a kind of ‘welfare inequality’ among 
old and new pensioners in the longer term (e.g. 
simonovits, 2018). 
Many people, therefore, expect the 
solution to be the result of ‘more serious’, 
paradigmatic reforms. two important 
directions can be distinguished here, partial 
funding, which, for example, was introduced 
in Hungary in 1998 on the recommendation 
of the World Bank (World Bank, 1994) 
(with many errors that substantiated its 
almost complete termination in 2011); and 
the swedish pension system with individual 
accounts, which is currently one of the 
main recommendations of the World Bank 
(Holzmann, palmer, ed. 2006; Holzmann, 
palmer, Robalino ed. 2012-13), although 
its expansion has recently came to a halt 
(Guardiancich et al., 2019). 
The essence of a partial (or even full, like in 
Chile) funding would be to reduce the portion 
of pension funded from current contributions, 
which would allow pension to be paid at the 
usual rate, even in a declining population. 
The downside is that in the meantime less 
contributions will be acquired by the public 
pension fund, so the state will have to make 
up for the deficit. in other words, it does not 
solve the underlying problem, it only dampens 
the exacerbation of financial difficulties by 
delaying it.
The introduction of individual accounts, 
or on its 'official name' the Notional defined 
Contribution (NdC) system, could be defined 
as a kind of ‘back to basics’ reform in which 
pensions are paid strictly based on individual 
contribution, as the official ideology behind 
the pAYG system explains. However, this only 
helps to rationalise the system and to make 
it (slightly more) sustainable over the long 
term by depriving it of the hard-to-justify 
eligibilities that have been introduced in the 
meantime.
However, these solutions, even though they 
are useful, because they can temporarily avoid 
exacerbating problems, can only be considered 
‘surface treatments’, because they do not 
solve (or even seek to solve) the underlying 
problem: low tFR, since the possibilities of 
rationalisation become exhausted over time, 
while uncovered pension promises (measured 
by implicit public debt) remain. 
in the case of capitalisation or funding, 
the picture is a bit more complicated. if, as it 
happened in Hungary, ‘capital’ simply became 
public debt, then we simply converted implicit 
public debt to explicit (Németh, 2009), 
meaning we converted a low-cost, long-term 
debt portion into a high-cost, short-term 
debt portion and therefore even worsened 
the situation (Banyár, 2011; and 2017b). if 
we capitalise the pension system so that the 
capital we use is actually domestic public debt, 
we have not replaced the pAYG system, since 
we have only transformed implicit public debt 
into explicit public debt. (This was recognised 
by generational accounting, which attempts to 
take into account the whole, that is, implicit 
and explicit public debt and share it among 
generations – Kotlikoff, 1993; in Hungary, 
see: Gál, simonovits, tarcali, 2001.)
However, the requirement to capitalise 
the pension system so that capital used is 
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not actually public debt (Kotlikoff, 1993; 
Feldstein, Martin, 2005) also does not result in 
improvement in the long run. While this seems 
to make the pension system independent of the 
birth rate, we know that an economy will only 
be viable in the long term if the population 
is changing in a suitable (even if declining) 
rate, otherwise even the funded system will 
not be able to eventually provide people with 
pension. in addition, announcing a funding 
would mean significantly reducing our current 
consumption in order to have an adequate 
pension. This even more questions whether it 
is worthwhile to ‘waste’ our limited income on 
economically unproductive things like raising 
children. in other words, funding is likely to 
further reduce tFR, thus exacerbating the 
pension problem in the long run, as this does 
not solve the underlying problem. (Banyár, 
2019a)
THe baSIc Problem and THe 
SoluTIon are dIFFerenT: InveSTIng 
In Human caPITal IS noT WorTH IT 
For THe PeoPle concerned
The underlying problem, that is low tFR, is 
probably because the cost of raising a child 
is increasing, while its economic benefit, at 
least to the individuals who finance most of 
it, is virtually zero, meaning it is not only 
bad business, but also a luxury consumption, 
which only few can afford.
tFR on different levels is declining 
worldwide. We do not know the reason for 
this, but by now all the factors justifying the 
so far high values have disappeared. High tFR 
used to be necessary, because:
•	for the vast majority of the population, 
children had significant economic 
benefits. From a relatively young age, the 
child could be employed on the family 
farm or hired out to work. in addition, 
they also provided care for elderly parents 
who could not work any longer, which in 
retrospect is referred to as the ‘traditional 
pension system’;
•	due to the high infant and child mortality 
rate it was advisable to have many children 
so that at least one or two survive to 
become adults, and can effectively help 
elderly parents when the time comes;
•	contraception was very difficult and ge-
nerally illegal, and marriage was common, 
so having a baby was a cheap, no-action 
required default;
•	childcare costs were low, no money was 
spent on education, health care, parents 
did not care too much about their children, 
etc. – and was completed relatively quickly 
at a low age.3
All these have changed radically by now, 
having a child has become a ‘project’ that can 
be planned rationally, and according to the 
calculation it is not worth it, because a child 
‘only’ has emotional value now. While the 
economic benefit of a child to society remains 
enormous, it is not society that wants to have 
a child, but individuals to whom society 
pays only a small part of the cost. The social 
benefits of children (they continue to operate 
the economy, pay taxes and social security 
contributions) are common; however, they are 
not realised by those who finance the majority 
of the ever-increasing costs of raising children 
in modern societies. 
so, if we want the pension system to be 
sustainable in the long term, parenting needs 
to become an economically ‘good business’, 
that is, we seem to have to deal with a factor 
outside the pension system. it is also clear that 
it is not having several children that is usually 
important. We should, however, raise more 
children who are given the impulses to make 
them fit into modern economy and division of 
labour. This is largely decided at a young age, 
so initial investment in human capital is key.
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in principle, there are two ways to make 
child raising ‘good business’ (for those who 
are capable of proper parenting), which 
we can call ‘input-’ and ‘output-financed’. 
According to the first, society provides 
resources for child raising; that is, it covers 
the costs, and according to the second, society 
reimburses the costs of child raising in arrears 
when it ‘takes over’ the ‘finished’ raised child. 
in practice, a combination of these shall 
be implemented, and the pension system 
is certainly worth incorporating (through 
‘output financing’). The reason beyond this 
concept is easier to understand if we take a 
look at where the developers of the principles 
of the modern pension system applied today 
made a mistake.
THe geneSIS oF THe Problem: 
ProblemaTIc PenSIon PrIncIPleS
Retirement solutions developed before 
the modern PAYG pension system
Modern pAYG pension systems are considered 
general in the developed world, including 
Hungary, are nowhere near exclusive, but 
where they exist, they form a major part of 
the pension system, are recognised even by 
the World Bank for making it famous for its 
typology since then (World Bank, 1994) by 
referring to this as the first pillar of pension 
systems. However, this pillar was the last one, 
the earlier elements of the pension system are 
much older.
There are three former pension solutions 
that were originally specific to different social 
strata, but have now become different pillars 
of a mixed system.
For the upper classes, pension means 
living off the returns of accumulated 
(inherited) wealth. The ‘minimum’ form of 
this is insurance annuity. technically, this 
is a (fully) funded defined contribution 
(dC) system. This was also tested as a state 
system: the Bismarck pension system was a 
funded system until its capital was used up by 
successive world wars and attempts to replace 
it were eventually given up.
Retirement itself was invented for 
employees. And retirement was funded by 
keeping employees on the ‘payroll’. An early 
version of this was the civil list pension 
provided by the king or other aristocrats, 
which gradually evolved into a more financially 
sound and well-founded occupational 
pension. its institutional form is the pension 
fund, which means a technically (often only 
partially) funded, defined benefit (dB) 
pension. in the West, this form has become 
more widespread, extended from employees 
to workers, and has become the main source 
of pension in many places and for many years. 
The level of the pension is guaranteed by the 
employer, and it is the ‘sponsor’ behind the 
pension fund, who holds its ground in the 
long run. This is why it is possible that such 
pension funds are not necessarily and always 
100 percent funded (that is, the amount of 
capital in the fund is less than the expected 
value of promised pensions) – so it is possible 
to grant a delay to the sponsor to perform its 
funding obligation later, at a more suitable 
time. 
For ordinary people, retirement (or its 
functionally equivalent ‘something’) was in 
fact a kind of intra-family transfer, facilitated 
by the transfer of the family business under 
the traditional division of labour from father 
to son, and generations were living together 
in one household. in the family farm, 
the economic performance and personal 
consumption of young children and the 
very old were not commensurate with each 
other, and they both received transfers from 
the active members of the family. However, 
young people received these transfers from 
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those whom they later returned it as active 
ones, namely from/to their parents; therefore 
the system can be considered as a kind of 
intra-family transfer based pension system, 
where the cycle of transfers is always closed. 
in a more general sense, we can say that 
parents invested in raising their children, and 
they received the returns of this investment 
in their old age, more generally, this system 
can be called funded, where capital is human 
capital. Expanding the analogy, this could also 
be called a fully funded dB system. today, 
this system has gone almost completely 
out of fashion in the developed world (but 
continues to exist in the developing world), 
due to changes in the division of labour, 
primarily as a result of the disintegration of 
traditional families living in one household. 
This change opened the way for a modern 
pension system, which was why there was a 
mass demand for it.
The overall conclusion is that until the 
modern pension system was established, there 
were only (at least partially) funded pension 
systems, but the capital behind the systems 
included human capital, and the ‘owner’ was 
who created it.
The modern PAYG pension system  
as an unprincipled combination  
of  previous solutions
The source of the modern pAYG state pension 
system is twofold: it is linked to the New deal 
of Roosevelt in the usA and the failure of 
Bismarck’s pension systems in Europe. 
The Roosevelt system of the late ‘30s and 
early ‘40s was admittedly an improvisation 
without any theoretical basis (Blackburn, 
2003). if we want to find out what could have 
happened, we can say that the state actually 
copied the occupational pension funds and 
created a ‘quasi-all-employer’ pension fund. 
With this ‘innovation’ it considered itself 
such a strong ‘sponsor’ that it went beyond 
the extreme value of the partial funding of 
the pension fund, i.e. 0 percent, which made 
it necessary to distinguish it conceptually (see 
pAYG) from funded systems. 
previously established European systems 
imitating the Bismarck system (including the 
Hungarian pension system) were originally 
funded; however, capital was taken away 
virtually everywhere by the two world wars. 
presumably, they saw the ‘success’ of the 
unfunded American system and decided 
to stop funding virtually everywhere after 
World War ii, not to mention that this period 
coincided with a major expansion of pension 
systems (or the nationalisation of possible 
investment targets in the soviet sphere of 
influence4), which would have made this 
requirement inherently illusory.
The theoretical foundations of the 
American system were provided by Samuelson 
(1958), but this was almost two decades after 
its introduction. The foundation laid down by 
samuelson was a great success, and probably 
also contributed to the European acceptance 
of the American system. Beforehand the 
operators of the system had a bad feeling about 
operating ‘ponzi-scheme’, but samuelson 
dispelled these concerns (Blackburn, 2003). 
Emphasising this (and somewhat refuting 
it), the Economist put it this way in 2017 
(in a dedicated part of a series of articles on 
top performances in economics): samuelson 
showed us that good ‘ponzi schemes’ do exist! 
(The Economist, 2017) 
According to samuelson, pensioners 
were formerly dependent on their children 
(‘traditional pension system’), but ‘it went 
out of fashion’ (he did not elaborate this). 
Therefore, successive generations have entered 
into a new ‘Hobbes-Rousseau social contract, 
whereby the present active ones support the 
present elderly, and in return can expect to 
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be supported by the active ones of the future. 
in addition, as the population grows (which 
is essentially expected), the elderly receive 
a kind of ‘biological interest’, meaning that 
they receive a higher pension in proportion 
to their contributions to the extent of growth 
in the population. Even though samuelson 
never said so, he clearly provided a description 
of a dC pension system where contributions 
are made by the individuals concerned and 
indexation is essentially a contribution mass 
indexation. And this is where the problems 
begin.
The implemented pAYG systems were 
exclusively dB systems, and this feature, 
‘imported’ from the occupational pension 
system, was taken for granted to the extent 
that at first there was great resistance to the 
conversion of pAYG systems to dC (NdC) 
systems, which was first implemented by 
sweden at the turn of the millennium, but 
was followed by many since. Although this is 
actually ‘the’ samuelson system, it is attributed 
to Buchanan, also a Nobel laureate (Buchanan, 
1968). in occupational dB systems, the 
contributor is the employer and the employee 
‘deserves’ his or her pension and may even 
lose it. in the dC system, the employee is the 
contributor by default (or, if the employer is 
the contributor, it transferred the contribution 
to the employee’s ownership), and the 
resulting pension is, therefore, his or her own 
and cannot be taken away. However, in the 
majority of pAYG systems implemented, the 
contribution is paid partly by the employer 
and partly by the employee, so the eligibilities 
are unclear.
to make matters even more complicated, 
everyone seems to have readily accepted that 
pensioners would benefit from the population 
growth, but they did not really want to bear 
the burdens of population decline. 
Another problem is that if we consider the 
pAYG system as a partially funded occupational 
dB system, we can calculate the missing capital 
of the system. This is the commitment or debt 
of the sponsor behind the system. Because in 
this case this is the state, it is public debt, and 
because it is not ‘printed’ public debt, it is 
called ‘implicit public debt’. [initially, it was 
not so obvious that the discovery of implicit 
public debt was also a huge act associated with 
Martin Feldstein (1974).] This, in turn, is a 
huge amount of multiannual Gdp that has 
to be paid to the active generations, which 
creates tension when the number of the active 
ones decreases, thus increasing their burden. 
since the Eu requires the Member states to 
announce their implicit public debt behind 
pension systems in a mandatory manner 
starting 2017, it (also implicitly) recognises 
its nature. (see the Hungarian data on the 
MNB’s website: https://www.mnb.hu/
statisztika/statisztikai-adatok-informaciok/
adatok-idosorok/xii-a-nemzetgazdasag-
penzugyi-szamlai-penzugyi-eszkozok-es-
kotelezettsegek-allomanyai-es-tranzakcioi/
a-penzugyi-szamlakhoz-kapcsolodo-egyeb-
adatok/a-haztartasok-tarsadalombiztositasi-
nyugdijjogosultsaga.)
it actually turned out that the current 
systems – in a deteriorating demographic 
situation – are basically ponzi-schemes and are 
making unfounded promises. This can also be 
put in such a way that the assets and liabilities 
sides of the modern pension system are 
independent of each other compared to other 
pension systems and contain no mechanism to 
reconcile or align them, and even the liability 
side (that is, pension promises) tends to inflate 
relative to the asset side (contribution capacity) 
(Banyár, 2019b).
The sustainability of the pAYG pension 
system, just like the traditional pension system 
(and even samuelson himself emphasised 
it), really depends on the right number of 
children. The system, however, does not 
recognise this, and even punishes child 
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raising, since those who raise children take 
away money from their own consumption 
and do not get any reimbursement for it, 
since the result of ‘investing’ in the child 
becomes a public good through the payment 
of contributions. 
samuelson was wrong, the traditional 
pension system did not go out of fashion, but 
because of the new circumstances, it no longer 
worked without the intervention of the state; 
therefore, it is now up to the state to enforce 
and organise that children, in the form of a 
pension, continue to reimburse their parents 
the cost of raising them. in other words, he 
should have explicitly linked pension promises 
to their fundamentals, to raising children, as 
happened in the ‘traditional pension system’ 
that was replaced by the modern system. in 
the case of a growing population, the mistake 
was not noticed, since it was only a matter 
of distributing the surplus, but in the case 
of a declining population, the situation is 
quite different, and the theoretical mistake 
was transformed into a practical tension and 
requires an intervention.
SoluTIon:  
IncenTIveS and aSSeT/lIabIlITy 
maTcHIng InSTead oF PonzI 
ScHemeS
The first step to finding a solution is to 
recognise that there is no system that produces 
long-term returns without investment. such 
systems only work temporarily and are called 
a ponzi scheme (see, for example, Banyár, 
2019b), which always ends up with big losses 
and many losers (who could not get out in 
time), because previously paid returns turned 
out to be the result of capital depletion. 
Current pay-as-you-go pension systems are 
gigantic ponzi schemes, as it is acknowledged 
and even emphasised that they are not based 
on any kind of investment.5 By the logic of 
the system, this can only be quit by death 
or the denial of contribution. One option 
is basically for actual pensioners (and older 
active contributors who already pay a lot of 
contributions), and the other is for the young 
active ones, so avoiding personal bankruptcy 
will offer different solutions to different age 
groups, resulting in a conflict among different 
generations, which becomes increasingly 
visible nowadays. (For an analysis on this, see 
Banyár, 2017a.)
The ponzi scheme nature of the system is also 
clear from the fact that the contributions are 
paid out immediately, without any investment 
period in between. And many people are 
misled by the fact that in many ways similar 
things happen in a funded pension fund. After 
all, the distinction between contribution and 
payment is made here, contribution is made 
into reserves, and payment is made from 
the reserves, in practice it is simplified: the 
contribution and the payment are ‘netted’, 
which means that payment is made from the 
current contributions and only the remainder 
is put into reserve, or only the missing part 
is taken out of the reserve. There may be a 
balanced position in which the reserve is not 
touched at all, and the payment is the same 
as the contribution, plus, technically, exactly 
the same amount of money is paid out that 
was recently received as contribution. But it 
is incorrect to think that it means that capital 
accumulation is completely unnecessary: this 
will be particularly clear when payments will 
be bigger than contributions and capital will 
be used up.6
What conceals the ponzi scheme nature 
of a system is that, on the one hand, is very 
similar to a funded pension system (it ‘only’ 
lacks capital) and, on the other hand, it 
actually used to be, at least in Hungary (and 
across Europe, but not in the united states!). 
However, by declaring that it is now operating 
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as a pay-as-you-go system, another important 
thing has been declared, but this has gone 
unnoticed. From here, the system depends 
on how many and what kind of children 
we raise.7 in other words, they actually 
switched to a system that was funded with 
human capital without drawing the resulting 
conclusions, and they continued to look at 
the system as if it were funded. By analogy, 
which is (would be) the exact opposite of this 
mistake: they pretended that the pensions of 
the participants of a funded pension system 
were not determined on the basis of the 
contribution to the capital, but distributed 
according to the number of children raised 
– of course, participants would be exempted 
from contribution for the duration of child 
raising. That too would be an unfair system 
and would slip towards unsustainability, but 
the problem would be exactly the opposite of 
what emerges now.
so the solution is: the promises of a 
system built on the return on human capital 
should be tailored to the actual investment 
in human capital, and that return should 
be given to the person who created it. As a 
result, asset/liability matching would take 
place in the system and would ultimately 
eliminate the issue of ‘sustainability’ of the 
pension system.
Therefore, the task is to lead the current 
pay-as-you-go system back to its economic 
basis, as professor Werding put it (Werding, 
2014 – though he did not strictly adhere to 
this in his specific proposal). The economic 
basis is that the pay-as-you-go pension system 
should be a human capital-based system that 
has been transformed into a ponzi scheme 
instead. The ponzi scheme characteristic here 
is, with a slight twist to the ‘classic’ ponzi 
schemes where investment is reclassified as a 
return, the difference here is that the return 
(which is practically the pension contribution) 
is classified as an investment, that is, it is 
considered as a contribution to the scheme 
(even the name suggests it). 
Contrary to the bad logic behind 
conventional pAYG systems and unlike fully 
funded (FF) systems, the so called 'pension 
contribution' should not be treated as a 
contribution to a reformed pAYG system, 
which should henceforth be referred to as 
a human capital based (HC) system, since 
here that is the return side. the investment 
side here is clearly and exclusively a child 
raising effort. that is, in an HC system, this 
needs to be accounted for as accurately as 
possible, and the income from child raising, 
or the pension funded from it, should be 
allocated as accurately as possible based on 
this effort.
Certainly the results of child raising can be 
very different, and what matters to us here is, 
first and foremost, how good a contributor 
the child is expected to be, i.e. how much 
contribution he/she will pay and for how long, 
and how intermittently he/she will receive 
earnings. As a result, there are some things that 
need to change in the HC system compared 
to the pAYG systems currently in operation, 
such as:
•	pension shall be increased by raising more 
and better educated children instead of by 
increasing contributions, meaning that 
the system does not incentivise increasing 
contributions;
•	however, child raising does not mean an 
exemption from the payment of pension 
contributions, since – as Hyzl et al. (2005) 
says – the contribution goes to the parents’ 
pension and child raising contributes to 
our pension; therefore, everyone is obliged 
to pay a pension contribution;
•	if our pension does not depend on pension 
contribution, it is reasonable to expect 
people to contribute in the same way. it 
shall not be the same amount for everyone, 
the contribution may remain with their 
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salaries, as this will provide a return on the 
parents’ investment in their children as 
human capital. if it was not efficient, both 
the salary and the contribution would be 
low, and vice versa. But the problem is 
that we expect contributions to be made 
for different durations; for example, 
contributions are compulsory throughout 
one’s active life, because they are different 
in duration. Therefore, the length of the 
contribution period in the HC system 
shall be standardised;
•	it is certain that the HC system cannot 
be operated by itself, there is a need for 
a traditionally funded subsystem for those 
who do not want or are unable to raise 
children.
Whether the implemented system will 
be more input- or rather output-financed is 
simply decided by the extent of increasing the 
direct reimbursement of the cost of raising 
children from taxes.8 However, this does not 
change the fact that even with 100 percent 
output financing, the pension contribution 
will not constitute the basis of the pension; 
therefore, even in this case, this transformation 
of the standard pAYG pension system is 
defective. How to deal with the different rates 
of input and output financing in the pension 
system is going to be explained in another 
specific article.
bIrTH raTe PromoTIon IS noT  
THe goal buT THe reSulT  
oF THe reForm 
it is very important to see that, despite it is 
communicated by both the supporters of linking 
child raising and pension (above all Botos, Botos, 
2011, 2012; Botos, 2018 and Giday, szegő, 
2012, 2018) and its opponents (Kovács (ed.) in 
2012, p. Mihályi, A. simonovits, p. Holtzer), the 
purpose of introducing the HC pension system 
is not to encourage child raising. (Even neutral 
analyses – such as simonovits, 2014 and Regős, 
2015 – examine whether fertility is affected by 
the consideration of child raising in pension 
allocation. The pronatalist line was characteristic 
already at the first international time linking 
pensions and child raising were mentioned – see 
demény, 1987). 
The problem with this is that, if that were the 
purpose, objections would be justified, such as 
why the pension system was being ‘touched’ 
to solve such a problem, and that child raising 
could be more efficiently encouraged by other 
means. But the objections are not justified, 
because this is not the problem either: the 
HC system has to be implemented, because it 
is inherent in the internal logic of the pAYG 
system. 
in other words, the purpose of introducing 
the HC system is not to encourage child 
raising, but to restore equity, so that the 
person who contributed to the pension base 
receives the pension.9 Fortunately, this is 
economically consistent with promising 
pension only to those who have created the 
contributory capacity to pay for it, meaning 
that this pension system will be sustainable in 
the long term, independent of the number of 
children born in the future. The HC system 
will automatically adjust to any number of 
children, so the biggest demographic public 
finance problem will be eliminated and the 
pension system will be independent of the 
number of children.
Of course, overall and logically we expect 
that the introduction of such a pension system 
will increase the willingness to have children10, 
not because the new system directly encourages 
childbirth, but because it eliminates the 
counter-incentive measures existing today in 
the poor pAYG system. 
The fact that the HC system does not 
consider itself as an incentive to have 
children also means that it is not intended 
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to force anyone to raise children, it is in the 
best interest of everyone (especially unborn 
children) if only dedicated parents decide to 
have children. 
However, the goal is twofold
No matter how many children are born, 
the pension system must be sustainable, which 
means that the assets and liabilities of the 
system are automatically matched by making 
having or not having a child financially 
neutral.
in the future, people should not be fooled 
by the illusion that they will receive a pension 
without saving or making any economic 
sacrifices. As in the future paying contribution 
does not make anyone eligible to pension, who 
does not have children shall put money aside 
and shall complement his/her pension with 
the money saved.
it is fair to say that it is logical what people 
say that the Earth is overpopulated, so it is 
advisable not to have children or only few. 
However, on this basis, it is not logical to 
attack the HC pension system, because its aim 
not to encourage child raising, but, through 
the recognition of child raising, neutralises 
whether a person receives pension from 
investment in human or ‘physical’ capital. On 
the other hand, it would be inconsistent if one 
were to argue for a reduction in population 
while arguing for the current pAYG pension 
system, because the former obviously hinders 
the existence of the latter. 
it is important to mention that almost 
all of the recommendations which want to 
take into account child raising are based on 
the mistake that the ‘traditional’ pay-as-
you-go system of samuelson is theoretically 
correct, meaning that the pension is based on 
contributions. Accordingly, almost all of the 
recommendations are based on the notion that 
not only pension contributions but also child 
raising should serve as an eligibility criteria; 
that is, child raising should also be considered 
as a form of eligibility. (Quoted papers by the 
Botos couple and authors Giday–szegő, as 
well as Werding, 2014 internationally)
to be honest, i also used to agree with them. 
i noticed early on that due to our upbringing, 
we owe a debt to society, which can usually be 
repaid through child raising or the pension 
system (Banyár, 2001; – later incorporated into 
Banyár, 2003/2017). in our joint book with 
József Mészáros (Banyár, Mészáros, 2003/2008), 
we raised the question of considering raising 
children as a contribution to the pension 
system, which we repeated in our proposal 
in 2010 (Banyár, Gál, Mészáros, 2010), and 
further elaborated in the early 2010s, but it 
was only published years later (Banyár, Gál, 
Mészáros, 2016).
in the references, i only found one exception 
to this approach, namely the study of 4 Czech 
insurance experts (Hyzl et al., 2005), who had 
already examined the issue from the point of 
view of asset/liability matching, and produced 
a similar proposal (or a proposal similar to my 
planned more detailed other article). i gave up 
on this approach back in 2014 (Banyár), as 
i have found that the recognition of pension 
contributions as an acquisition of eligibility 
is wrong, and the current pay-as-you-go 
system itself is incorrect in terms of asset/
liability management, even its justification 
by samuleson (1958) is questionable. One 
consequence of this is that the question does 
not have to be examined from a pronatalist 
point of view, as Róbert Gál, for example, 
usually emphasises. in his words, the current 
system imposes a kind of ‘child raising tax’ 
on parenting (Máriás, 2014), thus holding 
back fertility (something that has long been 
observed with the pAYG system – see, for 
example, Gál, 2003).
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1 My research was not funded and i have no special 
interests.
2 The present study does not address a specific state-
funded, pay-as-you-go pension system, but rather 
focuses on the common problems of all such 
systems. However, i took some concrete examples 
from the Hungarian system.
3 Of course, it is also true that fertility is still high 
in the developing world and in those strata of the 
developed world where these circumstances are 
still common. 
4 However, paradoxically this is why the state 
pension systems of the socialist countries could 
even be regarded as funded, because they were 
backed by enormous state property. However, 
nobody really thought about that.
5 The active defenders of the system consider this as 
an explicit advantage, saying it is cheaper, because 
they don’t have to pay for expensive investment 
activities. interestingly, and somewhat ironically, 
this ‘wisdom’ well-known to old pension 
bureaucrats is also quoted by the Botos couple 
with approval (Botos, Botos 2012), although 
they are also proponents of a system capitalised 
with human capital, but have not recognised the 
contradiction.
6 The line of thought comes from Lajos Bokros – see 
Bokros (2001).
7 interestingly, samuelson, who created the official 
ideology of the pAYG system, noticed this too, 
but did not draw the right conclusions from it. 
This was substantiated by the concept behind 
his model that he considered the cost of child-
raising as 0, so his system was logical, but he did 
not notice that this was a very special subcase of a 
general case.
8 taxes are used to finance the major part of 
children’s education and health care around the 
world. There are different types of childcare 
allowances (GYEs, GYEd, etc.) financed 
from taxes in Hungary. As of 1 July 2019, the 
Hungarian government announced further 
financial contributions related to raising children 
(extension of CsOK, soft loans, car purchase 
discount, etc.). These can be considered as 
tax-financed parts of child raising and would, 
therefore, provide pension for child raising based 
on a proportion of the tax paid.
9 i only dealt with the financial/economic aspects of 
child raising here, but, of course, there are many 
other aspects that i do not discuss; however, many 
others have already done so.
10 some people are sceptical about this, claiming 
that research proves that child raising is not 
influenced by financial incentives. i would like 
to make two comments: 1. Whether or not such 
a pension system encourages child raising is not 
an essential element of the line of thoughts above 
(my subjective belief is that it does). 2. Compared 
to what this system would provide in exchange for 
having children, the current financial incentives 
can only be considered ‘pocket money’, so it is no 
wonder that they have had little effect.
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